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1 Abstract
A set of about 80 researchers, practitioners, and federal agency program man-
agers participated in the NSF-sponsored Grand Challenges in Resilience Work-
shop held on Purdue campus on March 19–21, 2019 [21]. The workshop was di-
vided into three themes: resilience in cyber, cyber-physical, and socio-technical
systems. About 30 attendees in all participated in the discussions of cyber
resilience. This article brings out the substantive parts of the challenges and
solution approaches that were identified in the cyber resilience theme. In this
article, we put forward the substantial challenges in cyber resilience in a few rep-
resentative application domains and outline foundational solutions to address
these challenges. These solutions fall into two broad themes: resilience-by-design
and resilience-by-reaction. We use examples of autonomous systems as the ap-
plication drivers motivating cyber resilience. We focus on some autonomous
systems in the near horizon (autonomous ground and aerial vehicles) and also
a little more distant (autonomous rescue and relief).
For resilience-by-design, we focus on design methods in software that are needed
for our cyber systems to be resilient. In contrast, for resilience-by-reaction, we
discuss how to make systems resilient by responding, reconfiguring, or recover-
ing at runtime when failures happen. We also discuss the notion of adaptive
execution to improve resilience, execution transparently and adaptively among
available execution platforms (mobile/embedded, edge, and cloud). For each of
the two themes, we survey the current state, and the desired state and ways
to get there. We conclude the paper by looking at the research challenges we
will have to solve in the short and the mid-term to make the vision of resilient
autonomous systems a reality.
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2 Introduction
We lay out our vision for resilience in autonomous systems and our view of the
short-term and mid-term research challenges to realize the vision. Our view of
resilience has two primary aspects.
1. Resilience by design: This is the aspect that designs and develops cyber
systems so that they are resilient to a large set of quantifiable perturba-
tions.
2. Resilience by reaction: This is the aspect that works at runtime when
perturbations are incident on the cyber system and imbues the systems
with the ability to “bounce back” quickly after a failure triggered by a
perturbation.
Note, of course, that these two aspects of resilience are intertwined: systems
can be designed so that they incorporate resilience by reaction.
We also make specific the notion of perturbations that we want to deal
with. These take three forms: (i) natural failures of hardware or software (due
to bugs, aging, misconfigurations, resource contentions in shared environments,
downtime due to planned upgrades, etc.), (ii) maliciously induced failures or se-
curity attacks (from outside the system), and (iii) unexpected inputs (our target
class of autonomous systems will have to deal with the physical environment and
will interface with humans, which will produce unpredictable data to which the
system will need to adapt). The outcome of a perturbation that is not handled
can be a hard failure (crash or hang) or a soft failure (i.e., missing a deadline
for a latency-sensitive application).
We will first introduce as application drivers two autonomous application
scenarios where perturbations need to be handled. We will then discuss the
resilience by design aspect and then the resilience by reaction aspect. For each,
we will lay out the vision for the end state in 10 years. Then we will talk of the
short-term and mid-term research challenges, side-by-side with the promising
approaches being investigated today.
3 Autonomous Systems: Application Drivers
We first look at the state of resilience in two exemplar classes of autonomous
systems. By autonomous we do not mean completely autonomous, rather those
at varying levels of autonomy which involve some human involvement. We
speculate at a desired degree of resilience against perturbations and use these
as examples as broad motivation for the solution directions that we lay out in
the rest of the article.
The first class of autonomous systems is drones being used to deliver es-
sential medical supplies in hard-to-reach areas. We include in our purview
interactions among multiple drones and among drones and the non-(Computer
Science)expert humans responsible for their resilient operation. The second class
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of autonomous systems is rescue and relief by say an international humanitarian
agency in the face of a natural or a man-made disaster. This involves ground
and aerial sensors, distributed inferencing from their inputs through processing
at the edge as well as at the cloud.
Distributed Resilience in Multi-Agent Drones for Medical
Deliveries
Problem and Current State The field of systems and control has recently
been evolving from single monolithic system to teams of interconnected sub-
systems (or multi-agent networks). Because of the absence of centralized coor-
dinator, algorithms for coordination in multi-agent networks (especially large-
scale autonomous swarms) must be distributed, which achieve global objectives
through only local coordination among nearby agents [17]. In order to guarantee
all agents in the networks work as a cohesive whole, the concept of consensus
naturally arises, which requires all agents in the network to reach an agreement
regarding a certain quantity of interest [57, 75, 81]. A specific instantiation of
this general idea of multi-agent systems is a multiple drone system that is
responsible for transporting essential supplies to a population affected
by a natural disaster or medical supplies to a population where the
surface transportation infrastructure is poor [91, 30]. Some character-
istics relevant to our discussion are that there are multiple cooperating agents
involved, there is uncertainty in the physical as well as the cyber conditions
(flying conditions may be variable and the network connectivity among multi-
ple drones may be variable, as examples of the two kinds of uncertainty), and
there is also human involvement, such as, to task the drones or to refill the
supplies when the drone reaches a certain height above the ground at the home
base.
Consensus is the basis of many distributed algorithms for computations
[76, 117, 118], optimization [92, 23, 16], control [41, 36, 70] in multi-agent net-
works. The success of consensus-based algorithms relies on the assumption that
all agents in the multi-agent swarm are cooperative, that is, each agent pro-
vides its own state value to its neighbor nodes and follows a common update
protocol toward network objectives [81]. However, this particular autonomous
system presents the salient challenge that it operates in an open and potentially
adversarial environment, with exposure to a large and possibly unanticipated
set of perturbations. On the one hand, distributed algorithms are inherently
robust against individual node or link failures because of the absence of central
controller; on the other hand, the strong dependence of distributed algorithms
on local coordination raises a major concern of cyber attacks to the whole net-
work through local attacks to one or more vulnerable agents [86]. Thus it is
important to achieve resilience in order for autonomous multi-agent swarms to
be used in critical applications like the current one.
There has been significant progress made in developing robust distributed
algorithms by a combination of algorithmic and system-theoretic approaches in
[15, 85, 113]. Further advancements will have to be made to handle hitherto
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unanticipated perturbations, to deal with the resource constraints of individual
agents, to deal with time-varying characteristics such as link quality, and the
possibility of multiple coordinated or uncoordinated perturbations. An entire
new dimension arises due to the close interactions with humans—different pa-
tients may have different criticality requirements and these may change over
short time periods, the level of cyber expertise of the human users both at the
provider and at the consumer level will vary, and the time constants involved
for some operations will be of human scale rather than cyber scale. Yet another
dimension that needs significant research progress is scalability of these algo-
rithms. While they have primarily been developed and evaluated under small
world assumptions, they need to be re-designed or modified to operate at large
scales, of the number of agents, of the distances (and latencies) involved and
under the open-world assumption (new nodes can be added while the system is
operational), etc.
Cooperative Autonomous Rescue with Active Adversary
Operationalizing artificial intelligence (AI) for military applications often brings
to mind either offensive or defensive operations such as breaching defenses or
defending assets by intercepting projectiles [108]. Upon closer consideration,
many of the challenges faced when automating these operations, such as dirty
data, i.e. data with low signal to noise ratios, and sparse data, i.e. small
training data sets [52], are also faced when performing civilian rescue operations.
These resiliency challenges will be illustrated below with a small military rescue
vignette and correlated with current Army research efforts and gaps including
sensor fusion, autonomous coordinated swarms [90], and resource constrained
computing. [56]
Consider for a moment a complex future operating environment [80] where
military operations take place in the dynamic cyber and physical environments
of large urban areas. AI algorithms often require training from large amounts
of data for maneuver to include a priori knowledge of infrastructure including
roads, buildings, and subterranean passageways. During military operations ur-
ban environments can change rapidly as buildings are destroyed and barriers to
movement are erected, leaving little existing knowledge for aiding autonomous
maneuver. In addition, instability of remaining structures is likely compromised
so situational understanding (SU) must be gained on-the-fly, all while an ad-
versary is actively employing anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities.
It is against this backdrop that future autonomous system will be called upon
to locate, extract, and maneuver to safety either human teammates or other
autonomous systems. Gaining SU in this environment will require fusing data
from multiple sensing modalities over communications links that are unreliable
at best, or denied at worst, requiring AI that achieves consensus on courses of
action with incomplete information. Maneuvering through unstable structures
requires understanding of the physical world including solid body mechanics,
material strengths and failure modes, and physical systems. The rescue of peo-
ple or equipment is an operation that embodies these challenges for AI and
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autonomous systems to perform.
There are early research efforts to begin addressing many of these challeng-
ing areas including developing new sensor modalities, sensor fusion, and robotic
perception. In order to complete the task illustrated above, to perform a mili-
tary rescue operation, in the complex dynamic urban environment will require
significant effort in many areas including the integration of these efforts into
complex systems of systems. For instance, open challenges exist when sensor
fusion occurs with asynchronous data, unavailable data, or active deception.
Open challenges also exist for autonomous maneuver in dynamic environments,
e.g., off-road driving, and when interaction with the physical environment is
required such as moving obstacles or sliding a chair to remove an obstacle. Fi-
nally, communication and coordination of cooperating sensors and autonomous
systems when traditional modes of communication such as radio frequency (RF)
links are unavailable or denied is a long standing challenge that is compounded
for this scenario by the uncertainty of the physical environment. Advancements
that address these challenges will support civilian rescue operations such as in
natural disasters without endangering additional human lives of rescuers and
the compression of timelines for rescue operations.
4 Resilience by Design
In this section, we discuss some design approaches to autonomous software sys-
tems that can make them resilient to the set of perturbations introduced earlier.
For each we describe the problem context, some of the most promising tech-
niques being researched today, and the desired end state and open challenges
that we have to tackle to get there. This section includes discussion of at-
tacks against building blocks of autonomous systems, resilient ML algorithms,
immune-inspired resilient algorithms, program specification for resilience and
keeping in mind human-in-the-loop.
4.1 Attacks against building blocks of autonomous sys-
tems
Problem Context.
Deep learning algorithms have been shown over the past decade to be very
successful in various image and speech processing applications (see e.g., [46]),
and more recently for wireless communication systems (see e.g., [120] and [126]).
These success stories suggest the applicability of deep neural networks in a ubiq-
uitous fashion in the near future. However, for this to happen, such algorithms
have to be designed while taking into consideration potential exposure to ad-
versarial attacks, especially with their recently discovered vulnerabilities (see
e.g., [18]). Furthermore, these adversarial attacks are effective even when the
attacker can only perturb the test data, and even there only a small part of
each data point, as in evasion attacks (see e.g., [14]). One of the early and most
efficient attacks that have been proposed in the literature is the Fast Gradient
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Sign attack (FGS) [47]. FGS highlights the vulnerability of neural networks, as
the adversarial perturbation takes place in the direction of the gradient of the
loss function:
x˜ = x+ η ∗ sign (∇xJ(w, x, y)) . (1)
In (1), x refers to the original input sample and sign (∇xJ(w, x, y)) is the sign
of the gradient of the employed cost function J(w, x, y), which is a function of
the input, x, the desired output, y, and the classifier weights, w. The parameter
η is typically an lp-bounded perturbation.
More stealthy attacks, that typically incur significantly higher computational
cost, than the FGS attack have been proposed. Important examples are the
evolutionary-algorithm-based attack introduced in [78], the feature-selection-
based Jacobian Saliency Map attack introduced in [83], and the iterative Deep
Fool and Carlini-Wagner (CW) attacks introduced in [74] and [33], respectively.
In particular, iterative application of variants of the gradient sign concept were
shown to present more effective attacks than the one step application of (1).
This issue was closely analyzed in [60], where it was suggested that the one
step FGS attacks leaks information about the true label. The classifier can
then learn to perform very well on these adversarial examples by exploiting this
leaked information. We are inspired by such analysis as it relies on characterizing
the flow of label information to assess the effectiveness of an adversarial attack.
More generally, we believe that a principled approach to quantifying the value of
knowledge at both the attacker and defender, as well as characterizing the flow
of important information regarding the output of the machine learning models
and input sample distribution, is missing in the literature, and crucially needed
to reach a deeper understanding of the resilience of the foundational blocks of
autonomous systems.
Current State.
Recent work has also demonstrated the practical threat of adversarial examples
in the context of real-world systems and constraints. For example, Papernot
et al. [84] considered the scenario of a black-box threat model, in which the
adversary does not have access to the details of the internal model structure or
parameters, and also does not have access to the training data. Even in this
challenging setting, the threat of adversarial examples persists. For example,
it is possible for an adversary to locally train a model based on synthetically
generated data, with associated labels obtained from interacting with the target
model. The adversary can then use the locally trained model to generate ad-
versarial examples, using standard techniques such as the FGS and CW attacks
discussed above. This approach exploits the phenomenon of transferability of
adversarial examples: with high likelihood, adversarial examples generated us-
ing the adversary’s locally trained model successfully induce mis-classification
on the actual target model. Bhagoji et al. [13] explored an alternative attack
approach for the black-box setting, which does not rely on transferability. In-
stead, the gradient term in (1) is replaced by an approximate estimate of the
gradient which can be computed in a black-box manner by interacting with the
target model.
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Another thread of research has considered the question of designing physically-
realizable adversarial examples for autonomous vehicles, whose effects persist in
presence of real-world environmental constraints such as varying depth of per-
ception, varying angle of perception, and varying brightness conditions. Stan-
dard attack techniques discussed previously produce adversarial examples that
do not work well under such real-world conditions. Eykholt et al. [40] and
Sitawarin et al. [103] modify the attack optimization problem to include such
varying real-world conditions: their key insight is to incorporate a set of im-
age transformations such as perspective transformations, image resizing, and
brightness adjustment - as dataset augmentation techniques - while designing
adversarial examples and evaluating their efficacy.
Desired End State and Ways to Get There We note that machine learning
driven autonomous systems need to be resilient not just to perturbed variants
of the training or test data, but also to unexpected inputs, also known as out-
of-distribution examples, that do not lie close to the training or test data. After
all, applications such as autonomous vehicles operate in a dynamic environment
and may naturally encounter objects that were not part of the training/test
data. This observation has motivated a line of research on open-world machine
learning, which augments conventional classifiers with another classifier for first
deciding if the input is an in-distribution sample or an out-of-distribution sam-
ple [64, 19]. Approaches such as ODIN [64] rely on prediction confidence to make
a determination about a sample being in-distribution or out-of-distribution. De-
tected out-of-distribution samples can simply be rejected. However, recent work
by Sehwag et al. [97] has shown that existing open-world learning frameworks
are not robust: an adversary can generate adversarial examples starting from
out-of-distribution data to bypass detection.
Recently, there has been rapid progress in discovering effective defense strate-
gies. However, most of these defense techniques are based on custom tailoring
to the employed machine learning model, and the reported robustness would
not hold, not only if the model’s architecture change, but even if its param-
eters change due to new training data. For instance, the currently proposed
approaches for defending against the FGS attack as well as iterative variants
like the CW attack rely on simulating the attack. Furthermore, these defense
strategies assume knowledge of the attack strategy while designing the defense,
and provide little or no guarantees if the attacker decides to make, even very
slight, changes to its strategy (e.g., choosing another model than the target
model). Finally, while there is a vast literature on combating adversarial inten-
tional machine learning attacks, there is little available work on designing the
models to be resilient to unexpected inputs, that could result for example from
unexpected behavior of other system components.
We believe that there are three key aspects regarding the challenge of de-
signing resilient machine learning algorithms: 1- Perceptibility of the attack. In
the case of images, this is easily defined through human perception. For other
applications, straightforward detection mechanisms should be used to judge how
easy is it to detect the presence of an attack. 2- Value of knowledge in adversar-
ial and uncertain environments. For example, how to best exploit a finite-length
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secret key to protect a machine learning model, 3- Computational cost associ-
ated with attacking a target model. Modern-day cryptography approaches rely
on high computational cost associated with breaking their defense. Ideally, if
the attacker has full knowledge of the system and the defense strategy, as well
as an unlimited computational power, then there is no hope for resilience be-
yond the fundamental limits of the learning model; see e.g., [12] for the design
of classifiers that consider such attacks.
Resilient ML algorithms
Current State Over the past few years, significant advances in ML have led
to widespread adoption and deployment of ML in security- and safety-critical
systems such as self-driving cars, malware detection, and gradually in industrial
control systems. However, ML systems, despite their impressive capabilities,
often demonstrate unexpected/incorrect behaviors in corner cases for several
reasons such as biased training data, overfitting, and underfitting of the models.
In safety- and security-critical settings, an attacker can exploit such incorrect
behaviors to cause disastrous effects like a fatal collision of a self-driving car.
Even without an attacker trying to cause harm, a Tesla car in autopilot recently
crashed into a trailer because the autopilot system failed to recognize the trailer
due to its white color against a brightly lit sky.
Existing ML testing approaches rely mostly on manually labeled real-world
test data or unguided ad-hoc simulation to detect such corner-case errors. But
these approaches do not scale well for real-world ML systems and only cover a
tiny fraction of all possible corner cases (e.g., all possible road conditions for
a self-driving car). A promising and active line of research is to build a novel
set of testing and verification tools for systematically finding such cases and
ensuring security and safety of ML systems.
Our key insight is that most limitations of existing ML testing techniques re-
sult from their blackbox nature, i.e., they do not leverage an ML systems internal
behaviors (e.g., outputs of intermediate layers) to guide the test input generation
process. We have been developing whitebox testing and verification tools for
performing static/dynamic/symbolic analysis of ML systems [111, 116, 115, 87].
These types of analyses have been used successfully for testing and verification
of traditional software. However, the existing tools are not suitable for test-
ing/verifying ML systems for the following reasons. First, traditional software
logic is written by the developer while the logic of ML systems is inferred au-
tomatically from training data. Next, unlike most traditional software, ML
systems tend to be highly non-linear. Finally, for some of these autonomous
systems, it is a challenge to specify what is the expected behavior, considering
the large number of possible interactions among the cyber, physical, and human
elements. Therefore, support will be useful for specifying envelopes of desirable
(and/or undesirable) behavior from these systems, which should then be de-
composed into desirable or undesirable output states from each constitutent
algorithm.
Over the last three years, we have been building new testing and verification
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tools to bring more rigor to DL engineering [111, 116, 115, 87, 63]. Given the
challenges in specifying a full functional spec of DNNs, we design our tools to
check transformation-invariant properties such as slight light condition change
must not change the image class.” We have explored different design tradeoffs
between scalability, completeness, and soundness. Our tools have found thou-
sands of corner-case errors in different DL systems including state-of-the-art
image classifiers, object detectors, malware detectors, self-driving car software,
and cloud computer vision systems built by Google, Amazon, IBM, and Mi-
crosoft. We have also been able to verify some of these DL systems on popular
datasets. Our testing and verification tools often outperform other existing tools
by orders of magnitude (5,000x on average). We are encouraged to see that the
concepts and algorithms in our tools have already started to gain adoption by
other research groups and the industry [79, 125, 31].
Desired End State and Ways to Get There Despite the promising initial
results are, there are many difficult open challenges that are not yet addressed.
For example, existing DNN verification tools focus on verifying properties on
a limited set of test samples with the hope that the guarantees achieved on
individual samples generalize to unseen samples. One way to minimize such as-
sumptions is to try to adapt existing specific testing and verification techniques
(e.g., interval analysis, mixed-integer programming) to reason about distribu-
tions of inputs instead of individual inputs. Another interesting direction is to
support a richer set of safety properties, different types of neural networks (e.g.,
RNNs), and different activation functions such as Sigmoid and tanh.
4.2 Immune-inspired resilient algorithms
Immune-inspired algorithms fall in one of the following three sub-fields: clonal
selection, negative selection, and immune network algorithms. These techniques
are commonly used for clustering, pattern recognition, classification, optimiza-
tion, and other similar ML domains. They are relevant to design of resilient
systems because they are (under domain-specified assumptions) able to adapt
to uncertain system conditions or unexpected inputs.
Often, these immune-inspired algorithms start with processes reminiscent of
natural selection deploying the following steps: initialization, selection, ge-
netic operations (encompassing crossover and mutation), and termination,
which can occur when the algorithm has reached a maximum runtime or a set
performance threshold. Each of these steps mimics a particular phase in the
natural selection process. Further, in the selection phase of immune-inspired
algorithms, there is a metric such as fitness function that measures how viable
the solution is. Relevant to our discussion, the fitness function should incorpo-
rate metrics for resilience rather than just raw performance, e.g., how does the
transformation make the system more immune to new kinds of attacks. Alter-
nately, reinforcement learning (RL) can enable the selection of the best fitness
function and also confer resilience to the algorithms. This is especially helpful
in the case of evolutionary algorithms such as genetic algorithms being used
to solve difficult optimization problems where possible drawbacks are the long
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time to convergence and the possible convergence to a set of fitness functions
on the Pareto frontier, rather than to a single optimal point.
Evolutionary algorithms: Evolutionary algorithms are useful because they
can be used to search for resilient operating points of computing systems in
a manner that does not incorporate strong assumptions about the behavior of
the underlying system. There are essentially three very similar evolutionary
algorithms: genetic algorithms (GA), particle swarm optimization (PSO), and
differential evolution (DE), with GA more suitable for discrete optimization,
while PSO and DE being natural fits for continuous optimization processes. In
general, for evolutionary algorithms, after initialization, the population is eval-
uated and stopping criteria are checked. If none are met, a new population is
generated, and the process is repeated till the criteria are met. For increasing
the resilience of these algorithms, diversity-aware variants of these algorithms
have been proposed [44]. In most current applications, the optimization process
occurs offline, however, some recent systems have evolved to combine offline
training with further online adaptations, such as in our recent work on opti-
mization of configuration parameters of database systems in the face of dynamic
real-world workloads [67, 68]. Our systems combine offline training of the neural
network with online adaptation using time-efficient genetic algorithms to search
for discrete optimized state spaces. Such a design makes the system more agile
to real-world variability, such as intercepting dynamic, fast changing workloads
querying a database.
Desired End State and Way to Get There For resilient system design, we
would want static training and configuration of the system to be complemented
with dynamic learning, even in the face of sparse data. Drawing inspiration
from the immune system, one can think of the following characteristics for the
algorithms that may confer real-world resilience: stochasticity (increasing the
exploration space); reinforcement learning, which can contribute to emergent
behavior without global coordination; stigmergy where the “agents” interact
with the environment. Overall, these characteristics result in an emergent and
probabilistic behavior, with redundancy and adaptivity in real-world settings,
which are ideal for resilience.
4.3 Program Synthesis for Resilience
A resilient software system needs to be able to rapidly adapt itself for perturba-
tions. This is essentially a complex and intellectually demanding programming
task. Program synthesis, the process of automatically generating programs that
meet the users intent, holds promise to automate this programming task and sig-
nificantly increase the level of autonomy. The last decade has seen tremendous
progress in the efforts of program synthesis techniques, including the synthesis
of SQL queries [29], cache coherence protocols [112] and network configura-
tions [109, 39], or productivity software like Microsoft Excel [48, 49].
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A major challenge for program synthesis is how to obtain a precise specifi-
cation that reflects the programmer’s goals. Toward addressing this challenge,
programming-by-examples (PBE) has been an appealing technique [99, 100]. A
PBE system is given a set of input-output examples and tasked to find a program
whose behavior matches the given examples through iterative interactions with
the user. Another promising technique is sketch-based synthesis [105], in which
the programmer specifies a synthesis problem as a sketch or template, which is
a program that contains some unknowns to be solved for and some assertions to
constrain the choice of unknowns. While the combination of PBE and sketch-
based synthesis has seen many successful applications [101, 106, 102, 26, 58],
these techniques do not immediately allow the programmer to describe the
resilience aspects of the target program, which are usually quantitative and
optimization-oriented. For example, a critical assumption of PBE is that the
user knows what the expected output is, at least for some sample inputs. In the
resilience context, however, the programmer usually cannot quantitatively de-
termine how resilient a program is. Similarly, providing a sketch of the desired
resilient program is also challenging because the programmer may not know how
a resilient program looks like. Therefore, automatic programming for resilient
systems requires novel, user-friendly modalities for describing resilience-related
objectives.
While there has been substantial effort in formally verifying hardware and
software, these efforts have largely focused on functional correctness: ensuring
that the system has the functionality you want. The problem is that verifica-
tion is only as good as your specification: if your specification leaves details out
(e.g., some functionality is unspecified), then formal guarantees do not address
that aspect of your system at all. More importantly, even if all the functionality
of your system is captured, specifications often do not consider non-functional
aspects: timing, energy usage, interaction models, etc. These gaps in the spec-
ification leave open vulnerabilities. For example, underspecifying the timing
information of the system may leave timing side channels open, allowing at-
tackers to glean information about a system or even perturb its behavior. A
specification that does not account for the interaction model of a system may
not properly account for the ways that a human interacts with a system (e.g.,
not considering certain classes of inputs because the specification designer does
not account for humans providing perverse inputs). In the context of this under-
specification, no amount of verification can help provide resilience.
Of course, as specifications get more complex to account for all of the pos-
sible vulnerabilities and interactions, the scalability of formal techniques comes
under pressure, and formal verification becomes considerably harder. Indeed,
this means that in the presence of difficult verification tasks such as modeling
systems that involve human interaction, practitioners often use highly simplified
models of the system under inspection: easing the verification task by reduc-
ing the fidelity of the verification. While this “solves” the scalability problem,
it leaves open the question of how to do this model simplification: a model
must still capture enough behavior of the system for the formal guarantees to
be meaningful. Deciding how to model systems, therefore, becomes a serious
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bottleneck for verification, and there have correspondingly been only a handful
of studies of formal verification for human-in-the-loop systems.
Nevertheless, we identify verification of human-in-the-loop systems as an
important challenge for the design of future systems, especially as more and
more systems represent a collaboration between automation and humans. Con-
sider, for example, airline auto-pilot systems that expect certain input behavior
from humans but fail when the system enters an unexpected regime that causes
humans to apply unexpected control inputs.
Desired End State and Way to Get There We propose a couple of promis-
ing directions to pursue in this space. First, can models be automatically de-
veloped for human-in-the-loop systems? Is it possible to automatically simplify
a complex model (that might be automatically generated from observations of
a system) to target particular desired properties such that humans can then
intervene only to ensure that the model is faithful? As an example, consider
observing the throttle inputs to a vehicle along with observing the motion of
that vehicle to automatically infer a model relating the controls to the state
of the vehicle. Second, can we tackle the scalability problem by detecting sim-
pler properties? Rather than pursuing full formal specification and verification,
it may be sufficient to make human-in-the-loop systems more robust by auto-
matically identifying and flagging unexpected behavior (e.g., a conflict between
the current state of an airplane and the types of control inputs being applied
by a pilot), relying on the presence of a human in the loop to perform more
fine-grained corrective action?
Constructing resilient systems with human in the loop further raises new
challenges. The system designers should formally specify the envelope behav-
iors of humans and expected by humans. For instance, the design of a driver-
assistance system may specify the maximum tolerable latency in recognizing
objects to be 10 ms; an interactive image retrieval system may specify the
minimum time that the user is given to annotate an image; an AI-based auto-
completion code composer may specify the maximum human input rate is 50
program tokens per minute. With such explicit specifications of human behav-
iors, compiler and runtime may reason about system resilience by taking into
human factors into account. For instance, they may assert if the human users
are given enough think time to react to the detected anomaly, or if the human
users are overwhelmed by the amount of training samples they have to annotate.
As the demands of resilience, and formal design principles for resilience,
grow, we believe a key problem that should be tackled is scalability. How can
larger systems be verified? How can more complex specifications be verified?
Are there modular approaches to specification such that the verification task
can be tuned to the particular property that we desire to address?
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5 Resilience by Reaction
Here we talk about the online measures to deal with perturbations to ensure
that as much of the system functionality as possible is maintained. We structure
our discussion in terms of the execution platforms (mobile, edge, cloud, or HPC)
and the algorithms that are executing. That is, we consider what changes can
be made to either the execution platform or the algorithms to ensure that the
cyber system continues to operate in a resilient manner despite the occurrence
of perturbations at runtime.
Given the rise in data being generated by different sectors, especially in IoT
and automation, scalable data engines, low-latency in-memory engines (e.g.,
Redis), and stream analytics engines, are on the rise. In the context of scalable
data processing engines, we can consider the changing, unpredictable workload
patterns as perturbations to the system, in the face of which the system will need
to react. Without such reaction, the rate of servicing the requests will drop,
and in some pathological cases, requests for services will be silently dropped.
Most static database configuration tuners, such as [67, 114, 37], tend to
be “reactive” because they use optimization techniques for changing the con-
figuration parameters when there is a change in the application characteristic,
e.g., change in read-write ratios for database workloads. However, for evolving
multi-tenant global-scale pipelines and repositories, such as the metagenomics
repository MG-RAST [25, 119], the workloads may be more dynamic and unpre-
dictable, making it harder to “react” to workload changes on the fly. The goal
for the reconfiguration is to maximize the system’s performance, using metrics
such as the database’s throughput and tail-latency. For such cases, recently,
predictive configuration tuners that can work with dynamic workloads have
been designed, such as the NoSQL database configuration tuner Sophia [68].
Sophia incorporates a workload predictor and a cost-benefit analyzer (CBA) in
the optimization protocol that takes into account the cost of a reconfiguration
(transient dip in throughput, possible transient unavailability of data) and the
benefit (improved performance due to more optimized configuration). Subse-
quently, the system’s configuration parameters are changed only when the CBA
determines that the benefit outweighs the cost of reconfiguration. Then the sys-
tem implements a graceful, decentralized scheme for the reconfiguration, so that
data never becomes unavailable or is availability-aware, in sync with the orga-
nization’s service-level agreement (SLA). In the context of analytics workloads
running on cloud platforms, some current works, Selecta [59] and Cherrypick [3]
can optimize the parameters of the cloud computing environment by predict-
ing what will be optimal for the just-arrived application. Naturally, all this is
predicated on accurate enough prediction of changing workload patterns.
End State and How to Get There
The continuing challenge remains to perform live upgrade of systems due
to various events (changes in workload characteristics, data availability or con-
sistency requirements, spatial migration of computing equipment), without de-
grading the data availability. An additional dimension to this problem is in-
troduced by the use of cloud-hosted software, including some hybrid solutions,
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where part of the execution is on-premises and part on a remote cloud platform.
The update could be to the configuration parameters, or more intrusively, to
the software itself.
We can get there by learning from the long line of work on live upgrades
of software systems, primarily focused on single-node software [107, 53]. We
will have to bring in new distributed protocols that can progressively upgrade
a distributed application, while keeping data continuously available and while
respecting any end-user consistency requirement (SLA). It will be important to
bring in a predictive component to such work, so that the reconfiguration can
be initiated prior to the event, but in anticipation of it. Such proactive action
can ensure high availability as well as decision as to whether the reconfigura-
tion is beneficial at all. With respect to cloud deployments, cloud providers
have mechanisms for data migration and VM migration but they have costs in
terms of performance or simply $ costs. Therefore, the prediction can determine
whether the benefit normalized by the $ cost or the transient performance cost
is tolerable to the application.
5.1 Distributed Enclave Defense Using Configurable Edges
Problem and Current State In a geographically distributed system, the state
of the network can change rapidly due to any of a number of factors. As men-
tioned in the introduction, perturbations can result from failures, overt attacks,
or simply competition for resources. In most environments, there is no central
arbiter with global knowledge of the state of the network. Instead, endpoints at
the edges must infer network characteristics and adapt to changes to those char-
acteristics. This adaptation can take many forms, including rerouting traffic,
transforming content, and others.
There is a long history of adaptation on a case-by-case basis. For instance,
Fox et al. described a mechanism for dynamic transcoding of web images into
low-resolution forms [42]. Split TCP [8, 9] separates a TCP connection into one
connection between a client and a proxy, and another connection between the
proxy and a server; this allows the proxy to treat each part of the connection
appropriately for its characteristics, such as high delay or loss. Middleboxes [98]
are a generalization of this approach, interposing for various optimizations in-
cluding Split TCP [62].
A holistic view that deals with dynamic changes to the network topology
and workloads is more challenging. The DEDUCE1 system from Perspecta
Labs adds a “bump in the wire” between edges of a network and the WAN. The
DEDUCE box is a middlebox that monitors system behavior and performs a
number of optimizations. It splits connections for TCP and UDP , allowing it
to transparently reroute via other DEDUCE edge nodes, change characteristics
such as TCP congestion optimizations (e.g., from Cubic [51] to BBR [20], for-
ward error correction, transcoding, and others. To do this, it needs a strong
view of the state of the network [38], as well as the ability to evaluate ongoing
1DEDUCE stands for Distributed Enclave Defense Using Configurable Edges.
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network utility. It continually updates its plans [27] for how best to achieve its
goals, which may be implicit (competing best-effort flows) or explicit (informa-
tion about specific flows with deadlines).
Note that some aspects of its optimizations, such as rerouting, are similar
to the functionality of the underlying IP network: IP can dynamically detect
network outages and find new routes. The difference is that DEDUCE can
apply a more holistic view, for instance rerouting one flow, consistently, along a
particular path and a different flow along an alternate path. IP, by comparison,
would intermix the packets along each path, leading to packet reordering and
other performance implications.
End State and How to Get There DEDUCE is an example of a set of co-
operating middleboxes that operate in isolation from the rest of the network.
That is, each DEDUCE endpoint can work with other DEDUCE endpoints
to optimize traffic, but any traffic to non-participating edge networks is un-
treated. For the Internet to be truly resilient, techniques such as these should
be more broadly adopted. This means for example that any communicating
parties would be able to change their TCP congestion treatment dynamically
(e.g., learning the best algorithm for a given situation [104]), add or remove
forward error correction or other content-level treatments [65], adapt content to
reduce bandwidth requirements [22], etc.
The ability to adapt traffic is only half the solution, however. The bigger
challenge is in deciding how to adapt, in the presence of incomplete, distributed
information. Network tomography [38] is still in relatively early stages, but the
ability to gather and process dynamically changing state is crucial to network
resilience. A crucial aspect of this processing is being able to distinguish be-
tween failures due to resource contention and those due to hardware outages.
For instance, if losses are due to congestion, adding extra redundancy via FEC
simply contributes to the congestion; if losses are due to a faulty router, redun-
dancy may provide appropriate resilience. Similarly, the reaction to a denial of
service attack may be different from the reaction to normal high traffic.
5.2 Detecting Anomalies in Real Time through Text Min-
ing
In many scenarios, anomalies can also be uncovered through mining textual in-
formation (e.g., intruders may respond to system requests with na¨ıve or threat-
ening languages, a system may generate warning messages when detecting un-
usual situations, or people who observe something abnormal may signal alarms).
It is thus critical to detect anomalies through text mining, in real-time. Prepro-
cessing should be conducted beforehand by learning the text embedding space in
typical situations with the distributions of phrases, topics, sentences, language
features, and sentiments computed and stored, by using advanced text embed-
ding methods developed recently, such as Word2Vec [71], Elmo [89], BERT [35],
and JoSE [69].
End State and How to Get There. There is a need to develop stream data
mining methods that can operate in real-time, e.g., they can calculate in an
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online manner, distribution of text elements and monitor the distribution closely.
The language features (e.g., phrases, aspects, sentences, paragraphs, or topics)
that substantially deviate from the typical ones can be considered as semantic
outliers and should be detected and analyzed promptly by integration of text
embedding and outlier detection analysis methods [127]. Alternatively, one may
also use classification methods to train the system beforehand by collecting
text messages in previously happened abnormal situations and go against the
text happening in usual situations and such trained models can be used to
signal anomalies on the fly. One can also integrate text classification and text
outlier detection mechanisms to further enhance the quality of online anomaly
detection.
5.3 Approximate Computation with Resilience Guaran-
tees
Problem and Current State Many computations are inherently approximate—
they trade off quality of results for lower execution time or lower energy. Ap-
proximate computing has recently emerged as an area that exposes additional
sources of approximation at the computer system level, e.g., in programming
languages, compilers, runtime systems, operating systems, and hardware archi-
tectures, thereby enabling us to re-define how we think about programs that
implement novel solutions to an important class of problems. This has im-
portant implications for resilience because many demanding applications (such
as, streaming video analytics)cannot run on resource-constrained devices (such
as, IoT devices) because they exhaust the limited resources (memory, memory
bandwidth, compute, IO, etc.). Therefore approximation has emerged as a po-
tential technology, thus broadeing the domain of possible execution platforms
for a wide variety of applications. One challenge of the area of approximate
computing has been that the accuracy and performance of applying approxi-
mate system-level techniques to a specific application and input sets are hard to
predict and control. Today this leads to too conservative choices for approxima-
tion [61], unacceptable quality outputs [95, 7], and even incorrect executions [94].
While the current approximate computing approaches show that the techniques
have a lot of promise, making robust predictions about accuracy and perfor-
mance is a key challenge to successful adoption of approximate computing in
real-world applications.
The relevant current works in this space (approximation with resilience guar-
antees) answer the following three broad questions, in one or more of the do-
mains of mobile applications, streaming video analytics, image processing, vi-
sualization of scientific computation, etc.
1. When to approximate. It searches for the period of the applications ex-
ecution that is most productive to approximate. This is driven by early
evidence that depending on when a specific technique is applied, there
may be wide variations in time to convergence of the application or the
quality of the output [73]. The granularity of the decision will be applica-
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tion specific and also subject to execution time constraints. Finer-grained
monitoring and control are likely to lead to better performance-quality
tradeoff, but with a law of diminishing returns. However, such monitoring
and control come with their own overhead as well.
2. How to approximate. Any approximation technique typically accommo-
dates one or more configuration settings, which captures how aggressively
the approximation is done. For example, with a Neural Network-based
video analytics query processing, we have to determine what is the op-
timal number of layers or the level of downsampling of the video frame.
Consider that many applications in our target domains comprise pipeline
of multiple software components or methods, each of which can benefit
from one of several approximation techniques, and each technique comes
with its configuration setting.
3. How to approximate in input-aware manner. It appears from some early
evidence [122, 61] that in some important cases, the above two decisions
have to be made in an input-aware manner. For example, if one is approx-
imating a video stream and the stream consists of relatively static scenes,
more aggressive approximation can be applied than if it is a sports scene
with fast movements. Particularly, since we want to bound the accuracy
loss with approximation, it is important to take the input dependence
into account. For our target domains, the characteristic of the input may
change within the stream, requiring that the when and how decisions be
revisited.
End State and How to Get There There is the need to provide sound and
practical techniques to approximate computation, under varied and unseen in-
put data, while bounding the loss in accuracy and providing robust estimates
for reduction in energy consumption and other resources. This will enable the
grander vision off applications that can “flit” effortlessly between multiple ex-
ecution platforms depending on the three axes of what is the capability of the
platform, what is the resource demand of the computation (including approxi-
mation), and what is the cost of moving computation or data and orchestrating
possibly distributed execution among the platforms.
There is the need to develop core algorithms to predict the impact of approx-
imate computing on the accuracy and output quality. Further, we should create
the models such that they take into account the input dataset and the state of
the execution in deciding on the appropriate approximation configuration. The
current approximate computing techniques are often inflexible and may miss
profitable approximation opportunities or may mispredict the error rate. They
are also fragile in the sense that their performance can fluctuate unacceptably
under different input datasets. Fine-grained input-aware approximation algo-
rithms that the community is developing has the potential to overcome these
key challenges of approximate computing. Moreover, there is the need to show
how to combine system-level and application-specific approximation techniques
in the various target domains.
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5.4 Resilience to Stochastic Task Sizes in Distributed Com-
putation
Large scale computing jobs require multi-stage computation, where computa-
tion per stage is performed in parallel over a large number of servers. The
execution time of a task on a machine has stochastic variations due to many
contributing factors such as co-hosting, virtualization, hardware and network
variations [28, 121]. A slow server can delay the onset of next stage compu-
tation, and we call it a straggling server. One of the key challenges in cloud
computing is the problem of straggling servers, which can significantly increase
the job completion time [45, 82, 50]. Resilience to straggling servers is essential
to counter the possibility of missing deadlines in job execution. This is rele-
vant in autonomous systems of the kinds introduced earlier because there are
(soft) timing requirements and many workloads execute on cloud computing
platforms.
Current State: Some of the key approaches to mitigate the effect of strag-
glers are to have speculative execution which acts after the tasks have already
slowed down [34] or proactive approaches that launch redundant copies of a task
in the hope that at least one of them will finish in a timely manner [4, 5]. When
redundant tasks are launched on different servers, one approach is to perform
an erasure-coding that provides significantly more flexibility as compared to
replication. By having coding-theory based redundancy approaches, the user
waits for any k out of the n servers to finish, while each server runs a smaller
fragment of the task [2, 6]. Coding-theoretic techniques have been proposed to
mitigate the effect of stragglers in gradient computation [110, 124, 96]. In [93],
an approximate variant of the gradient coding problem is introduced, in which
approximate gradient computation is done instead of the exact computation. A
stochastic block code and an efficient decoding method for approximate gradient
recovery are provided in [24].
Desired End State and Ways to Get There: Even though different
approaches for straggler mitigation have been provided, efficient approaches re-
quire a holistic framework to understand the different design tradeoffs, including
the completion time of the jobs, and the additional server costs spent for the jobs
that will eventually not be completed. In order to come up with such a holistic
framework, it would be essential to develop data-centric proactive approaches
that leverage coding-theoretic and queuing-theoretic techniques. We note that
deep reinforcement learning based approaches have been considered for schedul-
ing jobs on the servers [88, 32, 10, 66, 1]. Reinforcement learning approaches
with speculative execution to mitigate stragglers have been considered in [77].
However, such approaches do not consider multiple jobs, heterogeneous servers,
coding-theoretic flexibilities, and approximate computing. Further, the alloca-
tion among different users must satisfy joint objectives, e.g., fairness, thereby
needing decentralized, scalable solutions rather than centralized approaches [1].
Accounting for all these degrees of freedom significantly enlarges the design
space and efficient approaches that explore the design space is an interesting
problem.
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5.5 Adaptability with Resilience Guarantees
Current State
Computing systems must function effectively in dynamic environments where
application workloads, available resources, and user requirements can all fluctu-
ate in unpredictable ways. To handle these dynamics, system developers create
mechanisms that enable the system to detect changes and then react to those
changes. Unfortunately, the policies that govern how these mechanisms are ap-
plied are often ad hoc and heuristic based. These heuristics are developed by
experts and tend to work very well on the system for which they were designed,
but they are not robust to changes.
As an example, Samsung’s scheduler for the Galaxy S9 smartphone has many
heuristics governing when to change clockspeed and when to migrate a process
between its fast, high-power cores and its slower, energy-efficient cores. The S9+
was anticipated to be an upgrade with higher performance and longer battery
life due to improved processor design. However, product reviewers found that
in practice, the S9+ exhibited lower performance and shorter life as scheduling
heuristics tuned for the S9 produced poor results on the S9+ [43]. The S9/S9+
is one example demonstrating how fragile heuristic-based resource management
can be, on complex, modern processor designs, and it demonstrates the need
for more principled resource management.
Desired End State
Our goal is the design and development of a set of robust policies that gov-
ern how autonomous systems should react to unforeseen circumstances. These
policies should be based on well-founded principles and come with clearly stated
assumptions about the conditions under which they would be expected to work
and the mechanisms available for the policies to be enforced. Furthermore, we
advocate for autonomous systems that do not just react, but react to accomplish
some high-level, user-defined goal. For example, such goals might be meeting
a certain latency constraint with minimal energy or finding the most accurate
model on an energy budget.
Ways to Get There A first step to achieve the vision of adapting to high-
level goals is to make those goals explicit in the program. In other words, there
should be a (possibly domain-specific) language for describing a program’s quan-
tifiable behavior and the desired range of behavior that represents successful
deployment. Furthermore, this language should also specify which behavior is
a constraint—which must be respected for correct operation—and which is an
objective—to be minimized or maximized subject to the constraints. In addi-
tion, this language should describe what system components can be changed to
affect the goals. The idea of specifying high-level goals and mutable program
components was a key part of the Self-aware computing project [55], language
support for making this specification a first-class object appeared in the later
Proteus project [11], and VStore [123], a video data store that respects encod-
ing/decoding throughput constraint while maximizing storage efficiency.
Clearly defining goals is key to resilience by reaction, as it is only through
the definition of goals that the system can observe they are not being met and
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react to restore correct operation. Of course, there is still the question of how
to react, or how to map measurements of goals into appropriate settings for the
mutable system components. We advocate a mixture of machine learning and
control theory to achieve this mapping. Machine learning models are well-suited
to capturing the complex tradeoff spaces that can arise in computing systems
with competing goals and many mutable components. Control theory is well-
suited to ensuring that constraints are met. Recent work demonstrates how the
two can be combined to achieve the best of both approaches [72].
While recent research demonstrates that it is possible to build adaptive sys-
tems to meet goals, one major challenge is unaddressed: How can multiple, in-
dependent adaptive systems collaborate effectively, if developed independently
by different stakeholders? For example, a mobile application might have goals
in terms of responsiveness and image quality, while a mobile operating system
might have goals in responsiveness and energy efficiency. If those systems are
developed independently, they could easily make conflicting decisions, negating
their potential benefits [54]. Thus, a common interface is likely necessary for
specifying adaptive components and the goals they effect; a high-level negotia-
tion mechanism are needed for coordinating their adaptations amongst different
such components.
6 The Road Ahead
Here we look at the road ahead with a summary of the short-term and mid-term
research and transition challenges.
1. Creating resilient systems out of individually vulnerable components. There
will be increasing needs to build resilient systems out of components that
are not individually resilient to the perturbations that the system will
have to face. Potentially there will be a large number of such components
composing the system. These components will be vulnerable due to in-
nate design and implementation vulnerabilities, or due to unpredictable
interactions with the external environment, either cyber or physical.
2. Speeding up the cycle of design and generation of attacks and defenses
against ML algorithms. There will be a two-pronged need in this space of
resilient ML—designing algorithms that are resilient by design to a well-
quantified set of perturbations and speeding up the discovery of vulnera-
bilities in realized implementations of the ML algorithms. The speeding
up will imply a partially automated process for discovery and patching
of vulnerabilities in the ML applications, as is being envisioned by the
DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge competition.
3. Synthesis of resilient programs by automated means. There is a growing
body of work on automatic synthesis of programs from specifications. We
have to consider that the synthesized program meets well-quantified re-
silience guarantees. The automatic synthesis can take the form of full
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program synthsis or, what is more likely, augmentation of an existing pro-
gram for the purpose of increasing its resilience. In this approach, we can
take inspiration from non-traditional sources, such as, immune systems in
biological organisms.
4. Automated configuration of increasingly complex systems, for performance
as well as for resilience. This includes efforts to automatically navigate the
large space of configuration parameters and determine the close-to-optimal
settings within a reasonable time bound, perhaps even online. While there
is a growing body of work on automated configuration for performance,
it will become important to perform such reconfiguration while meeting
resilience goals, such as, server uptime and data availability.
5. Use of compute power close to the client devices to increase the resilience
of large-scale multi-tier systems. This involves the use of edge comput-
ing resources for redundant execution, in addition to its traditional use
for reducing latency of short-running queries. We will move to some au-
tonomous systems whose algorithms can execute in parts in each of the
three tiers of execution—client devices, edge computing devices, and cloud
computing devices. The partitioning can happen flexibly, even at runtime,
and can be done not just for performance but also for resilience. Different
degrees of redundancy will execute at different tiers of the hierarchy.
6. Expanding the scope of approximate computation and distributed computa-
tion to include resilience as a first-order principle. Approximate compu-
tation will become an increasingly powerful means to execute demanding
applications on resource-constrained devices, or where energy resource is
at a premium. We need methods to approximate computation while still
being able to provide resilience guarantees, likely probabilistic. The same
applies to distributed computation, which will become increasingly rele-
vant to scale up demanding ML applications. In such cases also, the loss
in accuracy relative to the centralized computation must be bounded and
quantified.
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